Every work on Jewish thought and law since the twelfth century bears the imprint of Maimonides. A.N. Whitehead's famous dictum that the entire European philosophical tradition 'consists of a series of footnotes to Plato' could equally characterize Maimonides' place in the Jewish tradition. The critical studies in this volume explore how Orthodox rabbis of different orientations--Shlomo Aviner, Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv), Kalonymus Kalman Shapira, Joseph Kafih, Abraham Isaac Kook, Aaron Kotler, Joseph Soloveitchik, and Elhanan Wasserman--have read and (...) provided footnotes to Maimonides in the long twentieth century. How well did they really understand Maimonides? And where do their arguments fit in the mainstream debates about him and his works? Each of the seven core chapters examines a particular approach. Some rabbis have tried to liberate themselves from the influence of his ideas. Others have sought to build on those ideas or expand them in ways which Maimonides himself did not pursue, and which he may well not have agreed with. Still others advance patently non-Maimonidean positions, while attributing them to none other than Maimonides. Above all, the essays published here demonstrate that his legacy remains vibrantly alive today. (shrink)

This book analyzes three often-debated questions of Spinoza's legacy: was Spinoza a religious thinker? How should we understand Spinoza's mind-body doctrine? What meaning can be given to Spinoza's notions - such as salvation, beatitude, and freedom - which are seemingly incompatible with his determinism, his secularism, and his critique of religion. Through a close reading of often-overlooked sections from Spinoza's Ethics, Elhanan Yakira argues that these seemingly conflicting elements are indeed compatible, despite Spinoza's iconoclastic meanings. Yakira argues that Ethics (...) is an attempt at providing a purely philosophical - as opposed to theological - foundation for the theory of value and normativity. (shrink)

Ryan Wasserman explores a range of fascinating puzzles raised by the possibility of time travel, with entertaining examples from physics, science fiction, and popular culture, and he draws out their implications for our understanding of time, tense, freedom, fatalism, causation, counterfactuals, laws of nature, persistence, change, and mereology.

Rabbi Simcha Wasserman was a rosh yeshivah; kiruv pioneer; advisor; foster father; storyteller; transmitter of tradition; founder of yeshivos; hatzalah activist. This book captures him speaking with patience, simplicity, and intellect, about burning topics such as Holocaust, Kabbalah, Providence, and child-rearing. Includes a biographical sketch.

This volume concerns the status and ambitions of metaphysics as a discipline.

In Midstream, photographer Richard Wasserman documents the entire length of the 156-mile Chicago River and gives readers a glimpse into a mostly hidden landscape. As the twentieth century was drawing to a close and the city's industrial manufacturing era was rapidly waning, Wasserman took note of increased efforts to clean, beautify, and conserve the river, and he felt an urgent need to preserve the memory of Chicago's brawling past. As the project progressed and the photographer found himself captivated (...) by the river's extraordinarily diverse uses and visually rich landscape, he grew determined to capture the river in its entirety, in its varying moods and seasons, and from every possible vantage point during a time of rapid transformation. Midstream is the culmination of this ten-year project, in which there was always one more location to explore and another moment to capture. The result is a remarkable record of the Chicago River, revealing the nature of the waterway as it changed throughout the seasons and in relation to the dramatic extremes of Chicago weather. Scenes that had been hidden by foliage in the summer were unveiled in the winter when the trees shed their leaves. During dry spells when the water level fell, artifacts that were usually submerged became visible and offered tantalizing hints of the past. Wasserman's experiences along the riverbanks varied by location: in forest preserves he captured images of deer, beaver, and muskrats in the midst of idyllic flora; in dense urban areas his subjects were nineteenth-century factories and warehouses, many of which have been converted to offices and apartments, standing shoulder to shoulder with gleaming new office towers and condominium buildings. With an essay by Julia S. Bachrach, Midstream will be a significant resource and a lasting documentation of the Chicago River during the first decade of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

More than 20 years ago, the pioneering pediatric ethicist William Bartholome wrote a fiery letter to the editor of this journal because he thought a recently published statement on pediatric assent, from the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), showed insufficient respect for children. That AAP statement, like its 2016 update, asserts that pediatric assent should be solicited only when a child’s dissent will be honored. Bartholome objected that pediatricians should always solicit children’s assent and that (...) they should acknowledge and apologize when they treat children over their objections even when they must do so to promote children’s best interests. We think Bartholome was right. In this brief commentary, we elaborate on his perspective about the moral value of pediatric assent, and we suggest improvements to the corresponding clinical guidance. (shrink)

This commentary validates the fundamental evolutionary interconnection between the emergence of imitation and the mirror system. We present a novel computational framework for studying the evolutionary origins of imitative behavior and examining the emerging underlying mechanisms. Evolutionary adaptive agents that evolved in this framework demonstrate the emergence of neural “mirror” mechanisms analogous to those found in biological systems.

v. 1. Perakim I, II, II -- v. 2. Perek IV -- v. 3. Perakim V, VI.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 123-124 [Access article in PDF] Steven Nadler. Spinoza. A Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiii + 407. Cloth, $34.95. Nadler's book is a comprehensive biography of Spinoza. It gives, within the limits of the information available, a full presentation of the life and personality of Spinoza; ample information about the different milieus in which Spinoza grew up and lived; (...) about the vicissitudes of the public life which marked his life and work; about the ways in which Spinoza's work evolved and, although it is not meant to be an "intellectual biography" (xiii), a general description of his thought. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Spinoza.The book begins with the story of the Jewish Portuguese community of Amsterdam, constituted by former Maranos who emigrated from the Iberian peninsula. Becoming in a very short time a flourishing community, it was unique in many ways, and the author nicely shows this. He explains how it had to rebuild its Judaism practically ex nihilo, and how this fact caused many of the inner tensions and rifts that marked its history. Nadler tells minutely the way that led to Spinoza's famous excommunication and the roles played by the main personalities involved in this dramatic event, which was not only a rupture with the community, but actually with Judaism in general.The author proceeds to examine the life of Spinoza outside the Jewish community. [End Page 123] We learn about the religiously and politically radical milieu within which Spinoza, a twenty-four-year-old man cut off all family and community ties, now lived; about the famous Spinoza circle of friends and disciples; and, most extraordinary of all, about his rather rapid ascent to a position of prominence in the Dutch and the European République des lettres.Nadler skillfully presents the concrete context of Spinoza's work and gives a chronological account of the way his philosophy gradually took shape. One gets the right feeling about the manner in which it was intertwined with the political events, the ideological and theological controversies that often threatened to tear apart the Dutch society, and to which Spinoza's work is to a large extent a reaction.The specifically philosophical and scientific context of Spinoza's work receives extensive treatment as well. The author discusses the work of Boyle, Huygens, and others with whom Spinoza had scientific exchanges. Most importantly, Nadler describes the Cartesian context of Spinoza's philosophy—Descartes' own philosophy and the Cartesian movement in the Netherlands. He gives an ample account of Spinoza's many connections within this context; he describes Spinoza's many correspondents and recounts many episodes, not all of them well known.Nadler's work is essentially based on the existing material and the extensive work done in unearthing Spinoza's life and background. He does it in quite an impressive way—he seems to have covered all the relevant material and to have studied all the relevant fields. It is a work of compilation—but in the best sense of the word. It makes manifest that an enormous amount of work has been done on these topics in this century and particularly in the last twenty years or so. Nadler succeeds—this is certainly a tour de force—in integrating this enormous amount of material into a coherent whole in which he also manages to keep the right amount of literary fluency and readability. Not the least of the book's merits is that it is never boring.Although I would recommend the book without any reservation to anyone who is interested in Spinoza—both beginners and veterans—I must make two brief critical remarks: 1. There seems to be some bias in favor of the Jewish background of Spinoza. Sure enough, the book is divided into two almost exactly equal parts which recount, respectively, Spinoza's life before and after the cherem (which, as a matter of fact, divides his short life into more or less equal parts). Yet—and without taking sides in the ongoing... (shrink)

What is the relation between a clay statue andthe lump of clay from which it is made? According to the defender of the standardaccount, the statue and the lump are distinct,enduring objects that share the same spatiallocation whenever they both exist. Suchobjects also seem to share the samemicrophysical structure whenever they bothexist. This leads to the standard objection tothe standard account: if the statue and thelump of clay have the same microphysicalstructure whenever they both exist, how canthey differ in their (...) de re temporalproperties, de re modal properties and soon? In this paper I develop amereological answer to this question – thestatue and the lump differ with respect totheir parts and this explains theirdifference with respect to de re temporalproperties, de re modal properties andthe like. (shrink)

The debate over persistence is often cast as a disagreement between two rival theories—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately, the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of (...) these mistakes, and thus clarify the debate over persistence. (shrink)

Calls for incorporating social science into patient care typically have accounted for neither the logistic constraints of medical training nor the methodological fallacies of utilizing aggregate “social facts” in clinical practice. By elucidating the different epistemic approaches of artistic and scientific practices, this paper illustrates an integrative artistic pedagogy that allows clinical practitioners to generate social scientific insights from actual patient encounters. Although there is no shortage of calls to bring social science into medicine, the more fundamental processes of thinking (...) by which art and science proceed have not been addressed to this end. As such, the art of medical practice is conceptualized as an innate gift, and thus little is done to cultivate it. Yet doing so is more important than ever because uncertainty in diagnosing and treating chronic illnesses, the most significant contemporary mortality risks, suggests a re-expanding role for clinical judgment. (shrink)

Priority setting in healthcare is a highly contentious area of public decision making, in which different values often support incompatible policy options and compromise can be elusive. One promising approach to resolving priority-setting conflicts divides the decision-making process into two steps. In the first, a set of eligible options is identified; in the second, one of those options is chosen by a deliberative process. This paper considers the first step, examining proposals for identifying a set of options eligible for deliberation. (...) It focuses on the approach proposed by Anders Herlitz, which limits deliberation to options that are on a par; neither better or worse than, nor strictly equal to the alternatives. Once these “maximal” options are identified, the choice among them is made though a deliberative process that acknowledges the difficult tradeoffs which must be made. While parity and kindred notions are clearly useful in resolving some priority-setting conflicts, this paper argues that the conflicts that arise in setting priorities make it as difficult to decide which options are on a par as it is to decide among those options. The paper draws on priority-setting debates that occurred during the recent pandemic to illustrate the challenges in identifying eligible options: There may be sharp disagreement about how to understand and individuate relevant values; about whether certain values are relevant in a priority-setting context; about how to establish parity between “consequential” and “deontic” options, and about whether one option remains on a par with others after it is modified in various ways. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

What would be objectionable about sports doping if it were safe and legal? Some ethicists have justified their qualms about doping by invoking elusive distinctions between the natural and the artificial. But the harm in doping and other biotechnological enhancements is best understood in terms of the values of athletic competition—specifically, the spectators' identification with the performers, and the continuity and comparability of athletic achievement over time. Instead of endorsing categorical bans on specific enhancements, David Wasserman recommends caution informed (...) by a clear perception of the values at stake. (shrink)

This is a paper about the nature of metaphysical laws and their relation to the phenomenon of vagueness. Metaphysical laws are introduced as analogous to natural laws, and metaphysical indeterminism is modeled on causal indeterminacy. This kind of indeterminacy is then put to work in developing a novel theory of vagueness and a solution to the sorites paradox.

This article is written in the memory of Marcelo Dascal, and is conceived as an imaginary answer to a question put by him to the author: what is the point – given a shared non-religious, even atheistic, outlook – in translating (into the Hebrew) of Leibniz’s Théodicée? The two main theses of this imagined answer are: 1. That there is in the Théodicée a moral theory, partly implicit but irreducible and relatively independent of its theological content, and that this theory (...) is based on a paradoxical – but original and important – concept of moral necessity, extracted from the theory of the absolute need to choose the best possible; 2. That this concept of moral necessity may be developed into a theory of responsibility, looking back to the need to give accounts about what has been done (or not done), and forward, to what has to be done (or not) now. (shrink)

The book addresses the representation of three groups of "others" in Israeli schoolbooks: Holocaust victims, presented as the stateless persecuted Jews "we" might become again if "we" lose control over the second group of "others" - Palestinian Arabs - who are racialized, demonized and Nazified, and presented as "our" potential exterminators. The third group comprises non-European (Mizrahi and Ethiopian) Jews, portrayed as backward people who lack history or culture, requiring constant acculturation by "Western" Israel. Thus, a rhetoric of victimhood and (...) power evolves, and a nationalistic interpretation of the "never again" imperative is inculcated, justifying the Occupation and oppression of Palestinians and the discrimination of non-European Jews. Advocating a multidirectional memory, the book proposes an alternative Hebrew-Arabic, multi-voiced and poly-centered curriculum that would relate the untold accounts of the people whom the pedagogic version of history seeks exclude. Instead of traumatizing and urging vengeance, it will encourage discussion and celebrate diversity and hybridity. (shrink)

When a patient lacks decision-making capacity, then according to standard clinical ethics practice in the United States, the health care team should seek guidance from a surrogate decision-maker, either previously selected by the patient or appointed by the courts. If there are no surrogates willing or able to exercise substituted judgment, then the team is to choose interventions that promote a patient’s best interests. We argue that, even when there is input from a surrogate, patient preferences should be an additional (...) source of guidance for decisions about patients who lack decision-making capacity. (shrink)

In his thoughtful defence of very modest moral enhancement, David DeGrazia1 makes the following assumption: ‘Behavioural improvement is highly desirable in the interest of making the world a better place and securing better lives for human beings and other sentient beings’. Later in the paper, he gives a list of some psychological characteristics that ‘all reasonable people can agree … represent moral defects’. I think I am a reasonable person, and I agree that most if not all items on the (...) lists do represent moral defects—I certainly would regard them as such in a close family member or friend. But if I were in the business of ‘making the world a better place and securing better lives for human beings and other sentient beings’, I would hesitate to prescribe moral enhancement for everyone with these acknowledged defects. A lot of good work, from removing tumours to negotiating treaties, may be best done by people with serious moral defects.For a simple consequentialist, a moral defect is just a trait that tends to make the world a worse place. Not being a consequentialist, I think that moral defects should be identified independently of their tendency to produce worse outcomes. For this reason, I think it's necessary to qualify DeGrazia's starting assumption—I think behavioural improvement may sometimes be undesirable if our goal is to make the world a better place. My reasons will be familiar to readers of Bernard Williams.As …. (shrink)

Proposals for allocating scarce lifesaving resources in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic have aligned in some ways and conflicted in others. This paper attempts a kind of priority setting in addressing these conflicts. In the first part, we identify points on which we do not believe that reasonable people should differ—even if they do. These are (i) the inadequacy of traditional clinical ethics to address priority-setting in a pandemic; (ii) the relevance of saving lives; (iii) the flaws of first-come, (...) first-served allocation; (iv) the relevance of post-episode survival; (v) the difference between age and other factors that affect life-expectancy; and (vi) the need to avoid quality-of-life judgments. In the second part, we lay out some positions on which reasonable people can and do differ. These include (i) conflicts between maximizing benefits and priority to the worst off; (ii) role-based priority; and (iii) whether patients’ existing lifesaving resources should be subject to redistribution. (shrink)

This paper examines the moral import of a distinction between natural and social inequalities. Following Thomas Nagel, it argues for a “denatured” distinction that relies less on the biological vs. social causation of inequalities than on the idea that society is morally responsible for some inequalities but not others. It maintains that securing fair equality of opportunity by eliminating such social inequalities has particularly high priority in distributive justice. Departing from Nagel, it argues that society can be responsible for inequalities (...) not only when they are the unintended result of justifiable projects, but even when their alleviation would be very costly. Sharing Nagel’s general concept of ‘social inequality’, then, this paper proposes a far more expansive conception. We argue that many disadvantages due to disability fall under this conception. Eliminating or alleviating those disadvantages should be regarded as securing fair equality of opportunity, not improving the condition of the worst-off. (shrink)